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We use an extended Barro-Becker model of endogenous fertility, in which parents are heterogeneous
in their labor productivity, to study the efficient degree of consumption inequality in the long run.
In our environment a utilitarian planner allows for consumption inequality even when labor productivity
is public information. We show that adding private information does not alter this result. We also show
that the informationally constrained optimal insurance contract has a resetting property - whenever
a family line experiences the highest shock, the continuation utility of each child is reset to a (high)
level that is independent of history. This implies that there is a non-trivial, stationary distribution over
continuation utilities and there is no mass at misery. The novelty of our approach is that the no-immiseration
result is achieved without requiring that the objectives of the planner and the private agents disagree.
Because there is no discrepancy between planner and private agents' objectives, the policy implications
for implementation of the efficient allocation differ from previous results in the literature. Two examples
of these are: 1) estate taxes are positive and 2) there are positive taxes on family size.
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A key question in normative public nance is the extent to which it is socially ecient
to insure agents against shocks to their circumstances. The basic trade-o is one between
providing incentives for productive agents to work hard { thereby making the pie big { versus
promising to transfer resources from more productive agents to less to insure them against
the possibility of being poor. This is the problem rst analyzed in Mirrlees (1971) where
he characterized the solution to a problem of this form in a static setting. More recently, a
series of authors (e.g., Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990) and Atkeson and Lucas Jr.
(1992)) have extended this analysis to cover dynamic settings { agents are more productive
some times and less others. A common result from this literature is that the socially ecient
level of insurance (ex ante and under commitment) involves an asymmetry between how
good and bad shocks are treated. In particular, when an agent is hit with a bad shock, the
decrease in what he can expect in the future is more than the corresponding increase after a
good shock { there is a negative drift in expected future utility. This feature of the optimal
contract in dynamic settings has become known as 'immiseration.'
Two recent papers, Phelan (2006) and Farhi and Werning (2007) have given a novel in-
terpretation to the immiseration result. This is to interpret dierent periods in the model
as dierent generations. In this interpretation, current period agents care about the fu-
ture because of dynastic altruism a la Barro (1974). Thus, parents care about the level
of consumption of their children, their grandchildren, etc. Under this interpretation, social
insurance is comprised of two conceptually dierent components. These are: 1) Insurance
against the uncertainty coming from current generation productivity shocks, 2) Insurance
against the uncertainty coming from the shock of what family you are born into { what
future utility was promised to your parents (e.g., through the intergenerational transmission
of wealth).
In this case, optimally provided social insurance against the bad luck of lower than average
productivity will not necessarily lead to an outcome in which more and more of the wealth
of society is concentrated among an ever shrinking population { i.e., immiseration will not
necessarily occur. Indeed, whether or not this occurs is completely determined by whether
the planner discounts the utility of subsequent generations in the same way that parents do,
or if, to the contrary, the planner puts additional extra weight on future generations over
and above that given by altruistic parents.
When this is the case, Phelan (2006) and Farhi and Werning (2007) show that a feature
of the optimal insurance scheme is that there is a stationary distribution of consumption,
etc. This stationary distribution is what determines the long run level of inequality in an
2ecient allocation. It depends on the extent to which society weighs the utilities of future
generations beyond the minimum that occurs due to dynastic altruism.
In an intergenerational setting with dynastic altruism such as what is studied by these
authors, a natural question arises: To what extent are these results altered when the size of
generations { i.e., fertility { is itself endogenous as in the model of Barro and Becker (1989)
and Becker and Barro (1988)?
The study of this question is the focus of this paper.
We show that the explicit inclusion of the fertility dimension into the model alters the
qualitative character of the optimal allocations in two important ways. First, we show
that even when the planner does not put extra weight on future generations, there is a
stationary distribution in per capita variables. That is, per child consumption, labor supply
and expected future utility all follow a stationary probability law even when social and
private discount factors agree { there is no immiseration in per capita terms. In addition
to this, since fertility is explicitly included, the model has implications about the properties
of fertility in an ex ante socially ecient arrangement (for example, fertility also follows
a stationary law of motion). Because of this, the model has implications about the best
way to design policies relating to fertility choice (e.g., child care deductions, tax credits for
children, education subsidies, etc.) Incidentally, this socially ecient allocation also has
features observed in the data, such as a negative income-fertility relationship, intra-family
insurance provision and inter-vivos transfers. It therefore seems like the inclusion of fertility
is a very natural way of getting away from immiseration.
To develop these intuitions, we analyze a model in which labor productivity is private
information and varying over time { here interpreted as dierent generations. Thus, an
individual can be born with high or low productivity and only he knows this. He cares
about his own consumption, the size of his family (a la Barro and Becker (1989)) and the
utility level that each of his children will enjoy. Each of his children is also subject to a labor
productivity shock assumed to be i.i.d. Thus, this is a model of dynamic private information
with i.i.d. shocks in which dierent periods are interpreted as dierent generations. The
dierence between this and the previous literature is that family size is endogenous and
directly aects the utility of the parent.
From a mechanical point of view, the inclusion of fertility gives the planner an extra
instrument to use to induce current agents to truthfully reveal their productivities. That is,
the planner can use both family size and continuation utility of future generations.
In the normal case (i.e., without fertility choice), in order to induce truth telling today,
the planner (optimally) chooses to 'spread' out continuation utilities so as to be able to oer
insurance in current consumption. The incentives for the planner to do this are present after
3every possible history. That is, the continuation utility increases after a high shock and
decreases after a low shock. Hence, continuation utilities are pushed ever outward. Under
the usual Inada conditions, this outward pressure is asymmetric and has a negative bias { it
is cheaper to provide incentives in the future when continuation utilities are lower. Because
of this continuation utilities are pushed to their lower bound { inequality becomes greater
and greater over time.
In contrast, when fertility is endogenous, this optimal degree of spreading in continuation
utility for the parent can be thought of as being provided through two distinct sources {
spreading of per child continuation utility and spreading in family sizes through dierential
fertility. In general both of these instruments are used to provide incentives, but, the way
that they are used is dierent. We nd that there is a natural limit to the amount of
spreading that is done through per child continuation utilities. There are two manifestations
of this. First, there is an upper bound on continuation utilities that is never exceeded. So,
even if a family has a very long series of good shocks, the utility of the children does not
continue to grow but stays at a xed, high level, w0. Second, this same level of continuation
utility is used as a reward for the children of currently highly productive workers no matter
what their past history was (i.e., the previous continuation utility). That is, continuation
utility gets 'reset' to w0 subsequent to every realization of a high shock. Thus, there is a
limited amount of inequality in per capita consumption, labor supply, etc., in the long run.
This reasoning concerning the limits of long run inequality in per capita variables diers
from what is found in Farhi and Werning (2007) in two ways. The rst of these is the basic
reason for the breakdown in the immiseration result. In Farhi and Werning (2007), it is
because of a dierence between social and private discounting { society puts more weight
on future generations than parents do. Here, immiseration breaks down even when social
and private discounting are the same. The second dierence concerns the movements of per
capita consumption over time. The version of the Inverse Euler Equation that holds in the
Farhi and Werning (2007) world when society is more patient than individuals implies that
consumption has a mean reversion property. In our model, as discussed above, the resetting
property implies that consumption (and continuation utility, etc.) revert to the 'top' of the
distribution each time a high shock is realized.
The intuition behind the resetting property is the product of two complementary eects.
The rst of these concerns the assignment of continuation utility when there is no private
information problem. Because of the form of the Barro and Becker (1989) dynastic utility
function, continuation utility, from the perspective of the parent is a homothetic function
of family size and per child continuation utility. Because of this, the relative breakdown
between these two is scale independent. Thus, the increase in total family continuation
4utility in response to an increase in wealth (i.e., parent continuation utility) is equal to the
increase in total family size { per child continuation utility is independent of wealth. It follows
that, under full information, the continuation utility of a child depends on the productivity
of his parent, but not on the continuation utility of the parent { i.e., continuation utility
of children is reset in a way that is independent of the family history of shocks. When
productivity levels are private information this argument continues to hold, but only for
those types whose rst order conditions are undistorted due to the fact that no one wants
to pretend to be them. Since this always holds for the highest type, it follows that we have
resetting at any time the highest possible shock occurs.
In contrast to this, we nd that there is no upper bound on the amount of spreading
that occurs through the choice of family size. What we nd is that along any subset of the
family tree, the population dies out if the discount factor is the inverse of the interest rate.
However, this does not necessarily imply that population shrinks, since this property holds
even when mean population is growing. Rather, some strands of the dynasty tree die out
and others expand. Those that are growing are exactly those sub-populations that have the
best 'luck.'
It's also true that the driving force responsible for getting rid of the immiseration result
here is substantially dierent from previous work. From a mechanical point of view, the
allocations that are considered by these authors can equivalently be thought of as putting
lower bounds on the continuation utility levels of future generations in a problem where the
social and private discount factors are the same. As such, they are closely linked to the
approach followed in Atkeson and Lucas Jr. (1995) and Sleet and Yeltekin (2006). Here, the
reason is dierent. It is because of the inclusion and optimal exploitation by the planner of a
new choice variable, family size. Key properties of this new variable are that it is observable
by the planner and that the way it enters utility is to aect total continuation utility of the
parent.
There are several other interesting dierences between the two approaches. For example,
one of the key ways that Phelan (2006) and Farhi and Werning (2007), dier from earlier
work is that in socially ecient scheme, the Inverse Euler Equation need not hold. Indeed,
in those papers, the inter-temporal wedge is always negative in contrast to earlier papers.
This can be interpreted (in some implementations) as requiring a negative estate tax. This
has been interpreted as meaning that, in order to overcome immiseration, a negative inter-
temporal wedge was necessary. This does not hold for us however, since a version of the
Inverse Euler Equation holds. This implies that there will always be a positive 'wedge' in
the FOC determining savings and hence, estate taxes are always implicitly positive.
An interesting new feature that emerges is the dependence of taxes on family size. What
5we nd is that for everyone other than the highest type, there is a positive tax wedge on
the fertility-consumption margin { fertility is discouraged to better provide incentives for
truthful revelation.
Another dierence between the two approaches concerns the degree of intervention re-
quired to realize the optimal allocation. When social and private discounting agree (as is
true here), the socially ecient allocation can be implemented through a one time redistribu-
tion and a strong legal system to enforce private bequest contracts. These bequest contracts
strongly resemble intergenerational transfers observed in the data: poorer children tend to
receive transfers from luckier family members. In contrast, in Phelan (2006) and Farhi and
Werning (2007), there is a persistent dierence between the preferences of the planner and
the agent, and because of this, persistent intervention is required.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper is related to the large literature on dynamic contracting including Green (1987),
Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas Jr. (1992) (and many others). These papers
established the basic way of characterizing the optimal allocation in endowment economies
where there is private information. They also show that, in the long run, inequality increases
without bound, i.e. the immiseration result. Phelan (1998) shows that this result is robust
to many variations in the assumptions of the model. Moreover, Khan and Ravikumar (2001)
establish numerically that in a production economy, the same result holds and although
the economy grows, the detrended distribution of consumption has a negative trend. We
contribute to this literature by extending the model to allow for endogenous choice of fertility.
We employ the methods developed in the aforementioned papers to analyze this problem.
As mentioned before, a number of earlier papers have developed models with private
information where there is no immiseration, including Atkeson and Lucas Jr. (1995), Phelan
(2006), Sleet and Yeltekin (2006), and Farhi and Werning (2007). One feature that is shared
by these models is that they are mathematically equivalent to a problem with a lower bound
on continuation utility. Our paper diers from these in that the basic mechanism that drives
the result is dierent. Because of this, there are also dierent implications about evolution of
consumption, etc. In addition, our paper diers from the earlier work on on dynamic optimal
taxation as in Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003), Albanesi and Sleet (2006), and
Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) by characterizing to the design of optimal taxes when fertility
is endogenous choice variable.
Finally, our paper has some novel implications about fertility per se. First, the socially ef-
cient allocation is characterized by a negative income-fertility relationship|independently
6on specic assumptions on curvature in utility (see Jones et al. (2008) for a recent summary).
Given the realism of our results on implementation of this socially ecient allocation, this
suggests that intergenerational income risk and intra-generational risk sharing may be impor-
tant factors to explain the observed negative income-fertility relationship. What our model
has in common with other theories that deliver this relationship with ability heterogeneity is
that child costs are in terms of leisure (time). Second, very few papers have analyzed ability
heterogeneity and intergenerational transmission of wealth in dynastic models with fertility
choice. Our paper is most related to Alvarez (1999) who analyzes intergenerational income
risk but assumes that it is uninsurable (i.e. all children receive the same realization and there
is no insurance markets across dynasties) and does therefore not address the question of risk
sharing. For the most part of his paper, he rules out time costs and therefore nds that
fertility is increasing in both, ability and wealth, while bequests are independent on both.
Hence, this version of the model generates no intergenerational persistence of wealth, beyond
that coming from intergenerational correlations in ability shocks.1 Our model generates such
persistence even with i.i.d. shocks.
In section 3 the benchmark model is laid out as well as its properties. Section 4 contains
the general model with private information. In section 5 we study the main implications of
the private information model about long-run inequality. Section 5 is devoted to discussing
implementations of ecient allocations in our environment. Finally, in section 6, we analyze
numerical examples.
2 A Two-Period Example
In this section we present the key ideas in the paper in the context of a two period example.
We start by characterizing the ex ante ecient allocation under full information and then
go on to add private information.
Consider a two-period economy populated with a continuum of parents with mass 1 who
live for one period. Each parent receives a random productivity  in the set  = fL;Hg in
which H > L. 2 At date 1, each parent's productivity, , is realized, they consume, work
and decide about the number of children. The cost of having a child is in terms of leisure.
Every child requires b units of leisure to raise. The coecient b can be thought of as market
1When analyzing how crucial his assumptions are he nds that when per child costs are allowed to depend
on wages (i.e. a time cost), fertility is decreasing in ability and increasing in wealth, as long as utility is
more curved than log (i.e. number and utility of children are substitutes).
2We are normalizing population in date-1 to 1, which we will relax later.
7value of maternity leave for women. The child lives for one period and consumes out of the
savings done by their parents. The parent's utility function is the following:
u(c1) + h(1   l   bn) + n
u(c2)
where l is hours worked, n is the number of children and ct is consumption per person in
period t. From this, it can be seen that the parent has an altruistic utility function where
the degree of altruism is determined by . A worker of productivity  2  who works for l
hours has eective labor supply of l. For now, we assume that everything is observable to
the planner.
In what follows we denote the aggregate consumption of all children by C2 = n2c2. We
will use the following, technical conditions:
Assumption 1 1. The functions u and h are strictly increasing, strictly concave and
continuously dierentiable;
2. The function nu(C=n) is strictly quasi-concave in (C;n).
Suppose each parent is promised an ex ante utility W0 at date zero. We study the problem
of a planner that has access to a saving technology at rate R and wants to allocate resources



















[()(u(c1()) + h(1   l()   bn()) + 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Taking rst order conditions, we can write the optimality conditions as follows:
c1(W0;) = c1(W0;
0) 8;
0 2  (2)
u
0(c1(W0;)) = h











The interpretation of equation (2) is standard { it is the full risk sharing condition that
is common in Mirrlees problems without informational frictions and separable preferences.
8Equation (3) is also standard. It represents the static trade o between leisure and consump-
tion for dierent types. Using this along with equation (2), it follows directly that higher
productivity types get less leisure. Equation (4) is the Euler equation, augmented by the fact
that population is growing. Thus, the rate of return on capital, R, should be corrected by
the rate of population growth, n 1. Equation (5) is new here. It equates the marginal value
of having an extra child to the marginal cost of having an extra child. The two terms on the
right hand side reect the two components of costs that come from an increase in fertility.
First is the value of the extra leisure that is used to raise the additional child. Second, is
the reduction in per capita consumption that will occur in the second period if fertility is
increased but nothing else is changed. The left hand side is the utility value of the increase
in fertility.












As it can be seen from (8), the consumption of each child, c2, only depends on  and does not
depend on promised utility to the parent, W0. This is in sharp contrast to the special case in
which fertility is not a choice. In those environments risk sharing implies that consumption of
each child is independent of parent's shock  and depends directly on parents promised utility.
To gain insight about this result we rewrite problem (1) slightly dierently. Let m =
1 l bn be parents leisure. Consider the problem of social planner who minimizes the cost






























This is the same as problem (9) except that we substituted out hours, l() = 1 m() bn()
and per child consumption, c2 =
C2
n , and rearranged terms in the objective function. The
9rst term in the objective function is planner's expenditure on parents' consumption and
leisure (denominated in parents' consumption). The second term is the total expenditure on
children: their total consumption and time spent parenting (again, denominated in parents'
consumption).
We can separate this problem in two stages. In stage one planner decides how much con-
sumption and leisure to give to parents and also how much utility each parent should get
from having children. In the second stage planner decides how many children each parent
should have and total consumption of all children for each parent. We solve this problem
backward. Suppose the planner has decided in the rst stage that a type  parent will enjoy
utility W from having children. Then in the second stage the planner solves the following
problem for the parent who has shock :













Denote the solution to this problem as C2(W;) and n(W;). ^ V (W;) is the cost of delivering
utility W from having children to a parent who has type . In the rst stage the planner













()(u(c1()) + h(m()) + W())  W0
Denote the solution to this problem as c1(W0;);m(W0;) and W(W0;). Given cost
function ^ V (W;) the rst stage problem is standard, except for the fact that utility to the
parents from having children, W(W0;), explicitly depends on . The reason is that cost
of having children is parents' time and therefore this cost is dierent for parents who have
dierent productivity shocks. This makes the planner's cost function, ^ V (W;), explicitly
depend on .3
Our result that consumption of each child, c2, does not depend on parents' promised utility
can be understood by looking at the second stage problem. First note that the way c2 varies
with promised utility depends on how C2 (consumption of all children) and n (number of
3This is not the case when fertility is not a choice variable or cost of having children is only in terms of
consumption good. In those environments parent's future promised utility (utility form having children) is
equalized across dierent parents. Because cost of delivering those promised utilities are the same across
parents who experience dierent shocks.
10children) vary with promised utility. For example, in the case in which fertility is not a
choice and number of children are constant, both C2 and c2 are Monotone increasing in
W. We argue that in our formulation of altruism (which we borrow from Barro and Becker
(1989) and Becker and Barro (1988)) the ratio of
C2
n is independent of W. To see this
note that objective of the planner in the second stage problem is homogeneous of degree
one and constraint set is homogeneous of degree . It can be easily seen that the solution
to this problem is homogeneous of degree 1
 in W. In other words, the solution has the
form C2(W;) = ~ C2()W 1= and n(W;) = ~ n()W 1=. Therefore, the ratio
C2(W;)
n(W;) does not
depend on W and only depends on technology and preference parameters. Since this feature
of the solution will be a recurrent theme throughout the paper it is useful to give it a name.
We will call this the 'resetting' property { i.e., per capita utility is reset to a level that is
independent of state variables.
There are four qualitative properties of the solution to this problem that will have close
analogies in the results that will come later. We summarize them here as a Proposition for
future reference.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1:
1. c1(W0;) is independent of , and strictly increasing in W0,
2. l(W0;) is strictly increasing in , and strictly decreasing in W0,
3. n(W0;) is strictly decreasing in , and strictly increasing in W0,
4. c2(W0;) is strictly increasing in , but independent of W0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
This Proposition shows one of the features of the model; when the cost of children is in
terms of parental leisure, a utilitarian planner would allow for consumption inequality. As
we know in the standard models with constant population, planners set marginal utilities
equal. Here the same property holds. However, the 'correct' marginal utility is the per capita
marginal { in period 2 it is n() 1u0(c2()). Therefore, since more productive households
have fewer children, full risk sharing implies a degree of inequality in consumption among
children. In this simple two period example, the inequality that results depends only the
parent's income rather than that of the child. A high productivity parent will have a lower
number of children and as a result of risk-sharing, her children will have a higher per capita
consumption.
Before we proceed further, it is helpful to present an asymptotic property of the model when
11W0 become very small and contrast it to a model with no fertility choice. For the purpose of
this exercise assume that both u() and h() are unbounded below. Then it is straight forward
to show that c1(W0;);m(W0;) ! 0 and W(W0;) !  1 as W0 !  1. Now consider the
second stage problem (problem (10)). If fertility is not a choice (i.e., it is constant), then we





=  1. This follows directly from
constraint (11).
However, when fertility is a choice variable, following the discussion above we know that







But we also know that
C2(W;)







Immiseration corresponds to the situation where
C2
n ! 0 as W !  1. The homoth-
etic formulation of utility usually used in Barro/Becker models of fertility choice gives an
extreme version where this does not occur {
C2
n is independent of W. Thus, although the no
immiseration result is particularly stark in the Barro/Becker case, we suspect that it holds
in much more generality.
2.1 Private information
In this section we use our simple example to show that when productivity of the parent is
private information a version of the resetting property still holds. More precisely, we will
show that the consumption of each child of a parent which has the high productivity shock
is independent of promised utility to parents (W0).
Consider again the original planner's problem (9) and assume that productivity shock  is
private information. Then, the appropriate planner's problem must also include incentive
compatibility constraints. In what follows we make the assumption that only downwards
incentive constraints are binding { a parent with shock H have incentive to pretend to be
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Note that in this problem no one pretends to be the highest type I. Therefore, the
allocations of this type are undistorted. To see this suppose  and  are the Lagrange multi-
pliers on the promise keeping constraint and incentive compatibility constraint respectively.
Then, the rst order conditions are:
(H) = ((H) + )u
0(c1(W0;H))
(H)H = ((H) + )h
0(1   l(W0;H)   bn(W0;H))
1
R





(H)c2(W0;H) = ((H) + )[ bh




Combining these equations we get:
Hu
0(c1(W0;H)) =
















4We can show that at the full information ecient allocations the downward constraints are binding and
upward constraints are slack. We also verify the slackness of upward constraints in out numerical example
(in innite horizon environment). In general we cannot prove that only downward constraints are binding
because the preferences do not exhibit single-crossing property.
13which is equation (8) evaluated at  = H. Therefore, as above, c2(W0;H) is independent
of W0. Moreover, the value of c2(W0;H) is the same under full information and private
information (nothing in above equation depends on the incentive constraint).
There are two key features in the model that derive this result. First, is the homotheticity
property emphasized above. The second is the fact that upward incentive constraints are
not binding. Because of this, the allocation of the highest productivity type is undistorted.
Note that it is immediate that the asymptotic properties that we discussed for the full
information allocation in section 2 holds for the private information allocation of the highest
type.
3 The Benchmark Model { Full Information
In this section, we lay out the benchmark model with no private information and discuss
its properties. Time is discrete from 0 to 1. At date 0, the economy is populated by N 1
agents. Each agent lives for one period. Agents, when alive, draw labor productivity shocks,
can consume and have children. The cost of raising a child is in terms of time where we
assume that it takes b units of time to raise each child.
Here, the only source of uncertainty is the idiosyncratic risk of the productivity shock,
t that an agent in period t receives. We assume that t is an i.i.d. stochastic process and
takes on values in the set  and has distribution (). There is also a production function
F(K;L) = RK + L as in the example above where K is aggregate capital and L is the
aggregate eective labor hours. The initial level of capital is given by K0.
Dene Nt(t 1) as the current population of a cohort whose ancestors received history of











































The utility of an agent in period t is the following:
Ut = u(ct) + h(1   lt   bnt) + n

tUt+1 (14)























where the objective in (P1) is derived by iterating on (14)5.
As it is mentioned in Alvarez (1999), the above problem by itself is not concave in nt;ct.
This is due to the fact that we have the product of nt and ct in the budget constraint and
as a result budget set is not convex. Alvarez (1999) proposes a novel way of resolving this
issue by dening new variables as product of per capita allocations with population of the






















































 1) = N 1 : given:




6Notice that the product term in the objective function as well as in 13 is by denition Nt(t 1).
15We make the following assumptions to ensure that the above problem is concave.





is strictly concave and strictly increasing in
(C;N).





is strictly concave and strictly increasing in (M;N).
3.  < 1.
From the strict concavity of (P1') it follows that there is a unique solution.
It will be useful for what follows to make one further transformation of this problem.
Since the budget set in (P1') is convex and the objective is concave by assumption 2, we can
follow the literature and transform this problem into a recursive cost minimization problem
in which the extra state is continuation utility, W. See the Appendix for details. Thus, the
solution to above problem is the same as the solution to the following recursive problem:







































Although, technically, we have N as one of the state variables for our problem, it can be
shown that (because of homotheticity properties) we can rewrite the problem in terms of per
capita variables and eliminate N as a state variable. To do so, we dene w = W=N and
~ V (N;w) = V (N;Nw)=N. Using these denitions (P3) becomes:7


























where we have used W 0() = N0()w0(). Dene n() =
N0()
N . Using this denition, we can
eliminate N from the objective function as well as the constraint. It is then obvious that
~ V is independent of N and ~ V (N;w) = v(w). Hence, v(w) satises the following functional


















()(u(c()) + h(1   l()   bn()) + n()
w
0())  w
3.1 Properties of the Optimal Allocation
In this section, we discuss the properties of the optimal allocation from problem (P3).
First we have a standard result from dynamic programming:
Theorem 1 Under assumption 2, V (N;W) is strictly convex. Moreover if u() and h() are
C1, then V (;) is dierentiable.
Proof. See theorem 4.8 and 4.11 in ?.
To do any further characterization of the solution to (P3), we will want to use the FOC's
from this problem. This requires that the solution be interior however. The usual approach
to guarantee interiority is to use Inada conditions. We use a version of these here to guarantee
that c, 1   l   bn, and n are interior. The version that we use is stronger than usual and
necessary. We do this because we will need this stronger version below when we consider an
environment with private information.
Assumption 3 Assume that both u and h are bounded above by 0, and unbounded below.
Note that this implies that  < 0 is required for the overall concavity of utility and hence an
Inada condition on n is automatically satised.
Under this assumption, it follows that consumption, leisure and fertility are all strictly
positive. This is not enough to guarantee that the solution is interior however, since hours
worked might be zero. Indeed, there is no way to guarantee that l > 0 in this model. This is
because of the way hours spent raising children enter the problem. Because of this feature of
the model, it might be true that the marginal value of leisure exceeds the marginal product
of an hour of work even when l = 0. The usual way of handling this problem by assuming
that h0(1) = 0 will not work in this case since we know that n > 0. Hence, the marginal
value of leisure at zero work will always be positive, even if h0(1) = 0. Because of this, when
continuation utility is suciently high, it is always optimal for work to be zero.
In addition to this, in some cases, there are types that never work. This will be true when
it is more ecient for a type to produce goods through the indirect method of having children
17and having their children work than through the direct method of working themselves. This
will hold for a worker with productivity , if  <
E()
bR . That is, l(w;) = 0 for all w if  <
E()
bR .
For this reason, we will rule this situation out by making the following assumption:
Assumption 4 Assume that, for all i, i >
E()
bR .
This assumption does not guarantee that l(w;) > 0 for all w, but it can be shown that
for low enough continuation utility l > 0. In what follows, we will simply assume that l > 0
for most of the paper. We will return to this issue below when we show that a stationary
distribution exists.
Using the above derivation of (P4), we also have the following corollary. (See Appendix
A.2 for the proof.):
Corollary 2 Assume that V (;) is twice dierentiable. Then v(w) is convex and strictly
increasing and wv0(w)   v(w) is increasing.





; 8 2  (15)
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0(c()) = h














0(1   l()   bn()) (18)
The interpretation of the above equations are as before. First, equation (15) comes from
the Envelope condition and implies full intra-family risk-sharing. Second, equation (16)
represents the trade-o between leisure and consumption. Equation (17) is the standard
Euler equation and it represents the trade-o between consumption today and consumption
tomorrow. Finally, equation (18) equates the marginal benet of having an extra child -
LHS - to the marginal cost of having an extra child - RHS - which consists of immediate
utility cost in terms of leisure as well as the cost of having fewer per child resources available
tomorrow in terms of utility today.





0()) = bR (19)
Equation (19) together with corollary 2 implies that w0() is increasing in . Moreover, it
implies that w0() is independent of w. That is, there is no history dependence in continuation
18utility, when all the choices - labor supply, fertility, consumption - are undistorted. This will
play an important role in the rest of the paper. The intuition for this result is similar to
that given in the two period case { it follows from the homotheticity of the cost function,
V (N;W).
The properties of the optimal allocation for this problem are summarized in the following
proposition - the claims hold only if l(w;) is interior:
Proposition 2 Under assumption 2, the policy functions from (P4) satisfy:
1. c(w;) is independent of , and strictly increasing in w,
2. l(w;) is st. increasing in  and strictly decreasing in w,
3. n(w;) is st. decreasing in  and strictly increasing in w,
4. w0(w;) is strictly increasing in , but independent of w.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 1 describes the properties of long-run inequality in this model. In fact, we
know that starting from any ex-ante distribution of continuation utilities, if we apply the
above policy functions, the next period distribution of continuation utilities is independent
of the initial distribution. Moreover, the long-run distribution of w takes on values in the
solutions of equation (19) and hence, is a simple transformation of the probability density
of . From equation (15), the long run distribution for c can be directly obtained from that
of w. As can be seen it is not a degenerate distribution as would usually be the case with
separable utility between consumption and leisure. Even though this is true, it follows from
equation (15) that c does not depend on the current shock (t), but depends on the history
of previous shocks (t 1) as summarized in wt. Moreover, because of the resetting property
(the fact that w0(w;) is independent of w), it follows that wt depends only t 1. Hence, it
follows that ct depends only on t 1. Thus, although our model shares a common feature
with more standard models with non-separable preferences between consumption and leisure,
this arises for dierent reasons. Here, it arises from the non-separability between family size
and per child continuation utility.
4 Adding Private Information
In this section, we will extend the model in section 3. The model is exactly the same as before
except that each agent's productivity is private information. The planner, can observe the
19output for each agent but not hours worked nor productivity. Using the revelation principle,
we will only focus on direct mechanisms in which each agent is asked to reveal his true
type. As is typical in problems like these, it can be shown that the full information optimal
allocation does not satisfy incentive compatibility. Although the argument is more complex
than in the usual case, we show (in Appendix A.5) that under the full information allocation,
a higher productivity type would want to pretend to be a lower productivity type.
In addition to this, in Mirrleesian environments with private information where a single
crossing property holds, one can show only downward incentive constraints bind. Here,
however, the single crossing property does not hold due the lack of separability between
fertility and leisure. Because of this, we do not currently have a proof that the only incentive
constraints that ever bind are the downward ones. In keeping with what others have done
(e.g., Phelan (1998) and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007)), we assume that agents can only
report a level of productivity that is less than or equal to their true type.8 In the appendix,
we give a sucient condition for this to be true. Under this assumption, we can restrict
reporting strategies, , to satisfy t(t)  t. (Here, for every history t, t(t) is agent's
report of its productivity in period t and t(t) is the history of the reports.) Moreover, by
the later restriction on reports, we have t(t)  t. Call the set of restricted reports .
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8In numerically calculated examples, this assumption is redundant.
20Using the same techniques as in section 3, we can show that the above problem is equivalent
to the following functional equation:














































































8 > ^ :
As we can see, the problem is homogeneous in N and therefore as before, if we dene
v(N;w) =
V (N;Nw)



















()(u(c()) + h(1   l()   bn()) + n()
w
0())  w
u(c()) + h(1   l()   bn()) + n()
w
0() 
u(c(^ )) + h(1  
^ l(^ )

  bn(^ )) + n(^ )
w
0(^ ); 8  > ^ 
To ensure that the minimization in problem (P5) has a unique solution, we need the function
V (N;W) to be convex. A sucient condition for convexity of the value function is that the
constraint set correspondence should be convex with respect to the state variables. In this
problem, due to perfect substitutability of fertility and labor supply, our constraint set
correspondence is not convex. Therefore, we cannot show that the value function is convex
using the standard methods. One way to resolve this issue is by allowing for randomization.
Allowing for randomization, makes all the constraints linear in the probability distributions
and therefore the constraint correspondence would be convex. This is the method used in
Phelan and Townsend (1991) and Doepke and Townsend (2006). However, optimal plan may
not necessarily involve lotteries since convexity of constraint correspondence is only sucient
for convexity of the value function.9
9In our numerical example the value function is convex even without the use of lotteries. In the appendix
B, we characterize the case where utility from leisure is linear and there we can show that the constraint
21Therefore, we will make the following assumption:
Assumption 5 V (N;W) is convex with respect to (N;W).
4.1 Inverse Euler Equation
An important feature of dynamic Mirrleesian models with private information is the Inverse
Euler Equation. Golosov et al. (2003) extend the original result of Rogerson (1985) and show
that in a dynamic Mirrleesian model with private information, when utility is separable in
consumption and leisure, the Inverse Euler equation holds when processes for productivity
come from a general class. Here we will show that a version of the Inverse Euler equation
holds. To do so, consider problem (P5). Suppose the multiplier on promise keeping is 







0()) + () + 
X
>^ 
(; ^ )   
X
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(^ ;) = 0:

















(^ ;) = 0:
Moreover, from Envelope Condition:
VW(N;W) =  :







































































An intuition for this equation is worth mentioning. Consider decreasing per capita consump-
tion of an agent with history t and saving that unit. There will be R units available the
next day that can be distributed among the descendants. We increase consumption of agents













The rst is the resource constraint implied by redistributing the available resources. The
second one makes sure that the incentives are aligned. In fact it implies that the change in










Since the change in utility from this perturbation must be zero, we must have  = u0(ct(t)).
Replacing in the above equation leads to equation (22). We summarize this as a Proposition:



















234.2 The Resetting Property and Long Run Properties of Income
and Fertility
We have shown in section 3 that per capita promised value is history independent. Here
we will show that a similar property holds when we add private information to the model,
but only for types for which the presence of private information does not introduce any
distortions { i.e., for any type such that no other type is tempted to pretend to be. In this
case, the resetting property is satised. This can be derived from the rst order conditions
of the the recursive formulation. Suppose that  = f1 <  < ng. Taking rst order





















































We can see that w0(w;n) is independent of promised continuation utility. That is, w0(w;n) =
w0(^ w;n) for all w, ^ w. Denote by w0 this level of promised continuation utility { w0 =
w0(w;n).
The resetting property means that once a parent receives a high productivity shock, the
per capita allocation for her descendants is independent of the parents level of wealth { an
extreme version of social mobility holds.
Because of this, it follows that there is no immiseration in this model, under very mild
assumptions, in the sense that per capita utility does not converge to its lower bound. To
see this, rst consider the situation if n(w;) is independent of (w;). In this case, from
any initial position, the fraction of the population that will be assigned to w0 next period is
at least (n). This by itself implies that there is not a.s. convergence to the lower bound
of continuation utilities. When n(w;) is not constant, the argument involves more steps.
Assume that n is bounded above and below { 0 < a  n(w;)  a0. Then, the fraction of
descendants being assigned to w0 next period is at least
(n)a
(1 (n))a0. Again then, we see that
24there will not be a.s. immiseration.
We summarize this discussion in a Proposition.
Proposition 4 Continuation utility has a 'resetting' property, w0(w;n) = w0 for all w.
Assume that n(w;) is bounded above and below { 0 < a  n(w;)  a0 { then, if (n) > 0,
it follows that continuation utilities do not converge a.s. to the lower bound { no immiseration
occurs.
Intuitively, the resetting property here mirrors the argument given above in the full
information case (Proposition 1, part 4). That is, since no 'type' wants to pretend to have
 = n, the rst order conditions for the allocation when  = n are the same with or without
private information. Since we saw in the full information case that w0 is independent of w,
we have the same property holding here.
Next, we turn to a discussion of the limiting properties of fertility and population.
We have two tools at our disposal for this, our version of the Inverse Euler Equation and
the proposition above.
















If R = 1, we see that Xt = N
1 
t v0(wt) is a non-negative martingale. Thus, the mar-
tingale convergence theorem implies that there exists a non-negative random variable with
nite mean, X1, such that Xt ! X1 a:s:
As is standard in this literature, to provide incentives for truthful revelation of types,
we must have 'spreading' in (N0())
1  v0(w0()) (details in the Appendix). Thus, it follows
that X1 = 0 a:s: But, as we have seen above, it is not possible for v0(wt) to converge to
zero since it is equal to v0(w0) at least
(n)a
(1 (n))a0 percent of the time. Thus, it follows that
(N0(t))
1  ! 0 a:s:
Intuitively, the planner is relying heavily on overall dynasty size to provide incentives and
less on continuation utilities. This is something that sets this model apart from the more
standard approach with exogenous fertility.
Finally, the fact that (N0(t))
1  ! 0 a:s: does not mean that fertility converges to zero
almost surely, rather, it means that it is less than replacement (i.e., n < 1). This is most
25easily seen in the context of a discussion of the stationary distribution which we take up in
the next section.
Summarizing:
Proposition 5 Assume that R = 1, then, (N0(t)) ! 0 a:s:
5 Stationary Distributions
In this section we discuss the existence of stationary distributions for the endogenous vari-
ables of the model. There are two issues here. First, is there a stationary distribution for
continuation utilities and is it non-trivial (i.e., can we rule out immiseration)? Second, be-
cause the size of population is endogenous here and could be growing (or shrinking), we must
also show that the growth rate of population is also stationary. We deal with this problem
in general here, and then study a special case with only two shocks in detail below.
The policy functions for fertility and future continuation utilities in problem (P5') above
are n(;w);w0(;w). Consider a measure of continuation utilities over R, 	. Then, applying








8A : Borel Set in R
For a given measure of promised value today, 	, T(	)(A) is the measure of agents with











Now, suppose 	 is a probability measure over continuation utilities. 	 is said to be a
stationary distribution if:
T(	) = 		
This is equivalent to having a constant distribution of per capita continuation utility along
a Balanced Growth Path in which population grows at rate 	.
To show that a stationary distribution exists, the rst step will be to show that continu-
ation utility can be conned to a compact set. The key step in this argument, and one that
dierentiates the endogenous fertility model from the usual case, is to show that continua-
tion utilities are bounded below. That is, even as promised utility, w, gets lower and lower,
26continuation utility, w0(w;), is bounded away from  1.
To this end, we show that as w !  1, the optimal allocation converges to c = 0, l = 1,
n = 0. The interesting thing about this allocation is that no incentive constraints are binding
and hence, the optimal allocation has properties similar to those in the full information case
{ there is resetting of continuation utility for all types when w is low enough. Formally:





See Appendix A.7 for the proof.
The fact that, with utility unbounded below, the incentive problem is less severe for low
values of promised utility also holds in models with exogenous fertility. Loosely speaking, as
w gets smaller, the allocations look more and more similar to full information allocations,
whether fertility is endogenous or exogenous. What makes an endogenous fertility model
dierent from an exogenous one is the properties of full information allocations. We know
that with endogenous fertility, in a frictionless model continuation utility is bounded below
(by the shock-specic resetting values), while when fertility is exogenous, continuation utility
gets arbitrarily small. This immediately implies that there is no per-capita immiseration with
endogenous fertility.
From this, it follows immediately that continuation utility can be conned to a compact
set.
Corollary 3 Suppose that v is continuously dierentiable. Then for all ^ w < 0, w0(w;) is
bounded below on ( 1; ^ w].
Since utility is unbounded below and  is negative, n(w;i) must be positive. But, we
need more than this for the existence of a stationary distribution. We need to show that the
mapping 	 !
T(	)
	 is continuous. For this, we need that n(w;) is continuous in w and that
	 is bounded away from 0: Finally, we need continuation utilities to lie in a compact set
(i.e., we need to bound w0 away from 0 as well) so that the relevant function maps a compact
set into itself. This can be shown to be true in certain special cases (see the Appendix), but
we have not yet shown it in complete generality.
Thus, to proceed, we rst make the following assumption:
10The assumption about dierentiability of the value function is an ad-hoc one. It is perhaps worth
mentioning that since v is weakly increasing, by a theorem from Lebesgue, the points of non-dierentiability is
of measure zero. So we know that v is almost everywhere dierentiable. The classical proof of dierentiability
of the value function is due to Benveniste and Schienkman. Their proof requires convexity of the value
function, which we could not show.
27Assumption 6 There exists some  w < supc u(c) such that for any w 2 ( 1;  w], w0(w;)
belongs to ( 1;  w] for all  2 .
Now, we are ready to prove our main result about existence of stationary distribution.
Let M([w;w]) be the set of regular probability measures on [w;  w].
Theorem 4 If the solution to the functional equation implies a unique policy function
n(w;), for all (w;), then there exists a measure 	 2 M([w;  w]) such that T(	) =
E	(n)  	.
Proof. Since [w;  w] is compact in R, by Riesz Representation Theorem (Dunford and
Schwartz (1958), IV.6.3), the space of regular measures is isomorphic to the space C([w;  w]),
the dual of the space of bounded continuous functions over [w;  w]. Moreover, by Banach-
Alaoglu Theorem (Rudin (1991), Theorem 3.15), the set f	 2 C([w;  w]);jj	jj  kg is a
compact set in the weak-* topology for any k > 0. Equivalently the set of regular measures,
	, with jj	jj  1, is compact. Since non-negativity and full measure on [w;  w] are closed
restrictions, we must have that the set
f	 : 	 a regular measure on [w;  w];	([w;  w]) = 1;	  0g









The assumption that the policy function is unique implies that it is continuous by the
Theorem of the Maximum. It also follows from this that n is bounded away from 0 on [w;  w]







in(w;i)d	(w)  n > 0:





: M([w;  w]) ! M([w;  w])
is continuous. Therefore, by Schauder-Tychono Theorem (Dunford and Schwartz (1958),
28V.10.5), ^ T has a xed point 	 2 M([w;  w]).
This theorem immediately implies that there is a stationary distribution for per capita
consumption, labor supply and fertility. Moreover, since promised utility is uctuating in
a bounded set, per capita consumption has the same property. This is in contrast to the
models with exogenous fertility where a shrinking fraction of the population will have an
ever growing fraction of aggregate consumption.
The resetting property at the top, has also important implications about intergenerational
social mobility. In fact, it makes sure that any smart parent will have children with a high
level of wealth - as proxied by continuation utility. Finally, there is a lower bound on how
much of this mobility occurs:
Remark 5 Suppose that  w = w0. Choose A > 0 so that
n(w;n)
n(w;)  A for all w and . Suppose
that l(w;n) > 0, for all w 2 [w;w0], then for any 	 2 M([w;  w]), we have:
^ T(	)(fw0g) 
nA
1   n + nA
:
See Appendix A.10 for proof.
5.1 Special Cases
In this section, we examine what happens when there are only two possible productivity
shocks, L < H. We study two special cases given this assumption. In the rst, we allow
for a general utility function for leisure and give sucient conditions for the stationary
distribution to be unique. In the second, we assume that utility of leisure is linear and give
a global stability result.
5.1.1 A Uniqueness Result
We begin by allowing for general utility functions for leisure and assume that resetting
property at the top holds for every w < w0. For this case, using a direct constructive proof,
we show that the model implies a long-run distribution for per capita consumption and
characterize its properties. What is convenient about this example is that we can show that
if resetting holds at all w and assumption (6) with w = w0, the stationary distribution is
unique.
We know that w0 = w0(w;H) is independent of w for all w  w0. Hence, we can dene
29the following set of promised values:
W = fwnjwn+1 = w
0(wn;L);8n  0g
By Corollary 3, there is a lower bound w such that w  w  w0, for all w 2 W.
Assumption 7 Assume that wj 6= wi if j 6= i.
Consider a distribution over W, 	 = ( 0; 1;) with
P1
i=0  i = 1. For 	 to be a
stationary distribution, there must exist a  such that the following conditions hold:




 j = Ln(wj 1;L) j 1; j  1 (25)




















Given that in the original problem, we must have n(w;)  1=b. This means that the right
hand side of the above equation is lower than
P1
m=0(L=(b))m. Therefore, if we let  ! 1,
the right hand side converges to a nite number, Hn(w0;H). Notice that the left hand side
is strictly increasing and the right hand side is strictly decreasing in . Moreover, at  = 0
RHS is higher than LHS and at  = 1, RHS is lower than LHS. Because of this, if we knew
that RHS was continuous, this would be sucient to say that there is a  satisfying equation
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K < 1 or
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This shows that K is a bounded increasing sequence. Hence, there exists  such that
K !  with  > K. It needs to be shown that at , RHS of (26) exists. Suppose not
and that the sum is innity. Dene FK() to be the RHS of (26) up to K-th term. FK()
is a continuous and decreasing function. Therefore, K = FK(K) > FK(). Moreover,
FK() ! F() and hence F()  . This means that RHS of (26) cannot be innity
and (26) is satised at .
Now by Corollary 6 in the Appendix, we know that
9 A > 0 ; n(w;H)  An(w;L) 8w 2 [w;w]: (27)











































By the above inequality, we know that  0 exists and it is greater than zero. Moreover, we
can automatically dene  i's using (25). Hence, the denition of , being the solution to
(26) together with the denition of  0, makes sure that 	 satises (24)-(25) and hence, it is a
31stationary distribution. As it appears in the proof, in some sense, bounded relative fertility11
together with the resetting property at the top are the key elements of having a long-run
stationary distribution. First, every time any one receives a high shock, her promised value
is reset. Secondly, relatively, there are enough children being born by high types so that we
get stationarity. Moreover, the above proof shows that when the set of w's is restricted to
W, the stationary distribution is unique.
5.1.2 Linear Utility of Leisure
In this section we restrict attention to the special case where utility is linear in leisure {
h(m) = m. Here, things simplify considerably. In the appendix, we show that both n(w;)
and w0(w;) are independent of w. Thus, in the two shock case, there are only two relevant
values for continuation utility, w0 = w0(w;H) and w1 = w0(w;L). Correspondingly, let
ni = n(w;i).
Given this property for the policy function w0, for any 	, T(	) has mass concentrated
on the set W = fw0;w1g. Because of this, for the purpose of characterizing the stationary






As can be seen from this, the population growth rate is given by  = HnH + LnL.








Thus, for any initial distribution 	0, ^ T(	0) = 	 where 	(w0) =
HnH
 and 	(w1) =
LnL
 and population grows at rate .
5.1.3 Stability
The example with linear utility of leisure is useful because it shows that in some cases,
global stability can be guaranteed. It also shows a diculty with showing this property in
general. The rst step to prove global stability in a Markov chain is to prove that there
is a unique invariant distribution for a irreducible and acyclical Markov chain. Since our
transition function ^ T is not Markov, we cannot use the standard method of proving global
stability. In fact, the stationary distribution might not be unique. Intuitively, there may be
11A high type's number of kids relative to the low type's
32more than one population growth rate () that is consistent with stationarity even though





2) that are stationary { ^ T 
1 = T

1 and ^ T 
2 = T

2 { where both ^ T 
1 and ^ T 
2 are acyclic
and irriducible.12 We suspect that some progress can be made on this problem in some cases.
For example, in the two shock example given above, we showed (in section 5.1.1) that there
is a unique stationary distribution, but we have not yet shown that it is globally stable. A
key assumption in that argument is that there are no cycles in the sequence fwng. Indeed,
if this assumption does not hold, the stationary distribution together with the population
growth rate is not necessarily unique.
6 Implementation
In this section, we focus on implementing the ecient allocations described above through
decentralized decision making with taxes. We break this discussion into two components.
In the rst, we specialize to a two period example so as to explicitly characterize how tax
implementations are used to alter private fertility choices. In the second, we discuss the
'wedges' that appear in agents rst order conditions { i.e., how do these dier from the full
information ecient allocation.
6.1 A Two Period Example
To highlight that feature of the model that is new here { fertility choice { we restrict attention
to a two period example. We assume that there is a one time shock, realized in the rst
period. For simplicity, we will assume that consumption of children is xed at c2.
The constrained ecient allocation c
1();l();n() solves the following problem
12Mathematically, stationary distributions correspond to pairs of eigen vectors and eigen values for the
linear operator T, (	;). When T is the Markov transition matrix for an irreducible and acyclic chain, there
is one positive eigen value (which has value 1), and the associated eigen vector is the the unique invariant
distribution. For us, even when T is irreducible and acyclic, there may be two positive eigen values, each






















u(cH) + h(1   lH   bnH) + n

Hu(c2) 
u(cL) + h(1  
LlL
H
  bnL) + n

Lu(c2):
Now suppose that we want to implement the above allocation with a tax in rst period
of the form T(y;n). Then the consumer's problem is the following:
max u(c1) + h(1   l   bn) + n
u(c2)
s.t. c1 + k1  Rk0 + l   T(l;n)
nc2  Rk1





H) = 0 { there are no (marginal) distortions on the decisions of the agent with
the high shock. Thus, what we need to do is to characterize the types of distortions that are
used to get the low type to choose the correct allocation.
It is well known that, even in the simple case in which there is no fertiliy choice, the
constrained ecient allocation cannot be implemented by a continously dierentiable tax
function. (This is also true in our ennvironment.) However, there exists continous and
piecewise dierentiable tax functions which implement the constrained ecient allocation.
Next, we construct the analog of this for our environment.
Let  uL (resp.  uH) be the level of utility received at the socially ecient allocation by the
low (resp. high) type, and dene two versions of the tax function:
 uL = u(y   TL(y;n)  
1
R
nc2) + h(1  
y
L
  bn) + n
u(c2);
 uH = u(y   TH(y;n)  
1
R
nc2) + h(1  
y
H
  bn) + n
u(c2):
TL, is designed to make sure that the low type always gets utility  uL if they satisfy their
budget constraint with equality while TH, is dened similarly.13
13The assumption for xed c2 is added in order to simplify the above denitions. We can modify the above
34We will build the overall tax code, T(y;n), by using TL as the eective tax code for the
low type and TH as the one for the high type. Given this, it follows that the distortions, at
the margin, faced by the two types are described by the derivatives of TL (TH) with respect
to y and n.
Proposition 7 If the allocation is interior,
1. The tax function
T(y;n) = maxfTL(y;n);TH(y;n)g
implements the ecient allocation.
















3. At the choice of the low type, (y
L;n
















The new nding here is that the planner chooses to tax the low type at the margin for




L) > 0. In the Mirrlees model without fertility choice, for
incentive reasons, the planner wants to make sure that the low type consumes more leisure
(relative to consumption) than he would in a full information world { this makes it easier
to get the high type to truthfully admit his type. This is accomplished by having a positive
marginal labor tax rate for the low type. Here, there is an additional incentive eect that
must be taken care of. This is for the planner to make sure that the low type doesn't use too
much of his time free from work raising children. This would also make it more appealing
to the high type to lie. To oset this here, the planner also charges a positive tax rate on
children for the low type. These two eects taken together ensure that the low type has low
consumption and fertility and high leisure thereby separating from the high type.
6.2 Distortionary Wedges
In this section we discuss some of the properties of the socially ecient allocation charac-
terized in the previous sections and how it diers from the full information allocation. We
denition to allow for variable c2. In that formulation, given (y;n), T is dened as how much present value
should be taken away from each type so that he is indierent between deviating to (y;n) accompanied by
optimal saving and no deviation.
35focus on the distortions that are present in the leisure-consumption margin, the intertemporal
margin and the fertility-leisure margin.
1. The Consumption-Leisure margin: For a type (w;), we have:
u
0(c(w;)) =
h0 (1   l(w;)   bn(w;))
(1   l(w;))
where l(w;) { the 'wedge' in the consumption-leisure margin { is related to the
multipliers on the incentive constraints. Because of our assumption that only downward
incentive constraints can bind, it can be shown that l(w;) > 0. In this sense, the
distortion to the consumption-leisure margin that we nd here is the same as that in
a standard model without fertility choice. Intuitively, the planner taxes labor income
of the lower types to make it easier to separate them from higher types { i.e., to relax
incentive constraints.

















































































where (1 k(t)) is the wedge in the intertemporal Euler Equation. 14 When there is
14This 'wedge' has multiple implementations using taxes. In some of these the tax on capital income is state
contingent from saver's perspective, i.e., k(t;t+1), while in others it is not, i.e., k(t). See Kocherlakota
(2005) for a discussion.
36no private information, it follows, as usual, that k(t) = 0. With private information,
it follows, from above, that k(t) > 0. Intuitively, the planner dissuades agents from
saving at their normal level to reduce wealth, and hence, incentive problems, in the
future.
This is the same as what is found in Golosov et al. (2003). It has a slightly dierent
interpretation here since a period corresponds to a generation. Because of this, it
should be interpreted as a distortion in the decision to leave bequests (as in Farhi and
Werning (2007)). Thus, we nd that the 'tax' on aggregate bequests (B) is positive
here. To be added { @2T
@B@n >< 0?
3. The Fertility-Consumption margin: When there is no private information, the trade-o









0 (1   l(w;)   bn(w;)):









0 (1   l(w;)   bn(w;)):









0 (1   l(w;)   bn(w;))
where 1 + n(w;) is tax rate on the total increase in future expenditures that comes
with increasing dynasty size by one (i.e., on children, their children, their children's children,
etc.).
Hence, generalizing what we saw in the two period example, in general, the planner uses
a positive tax on fertility.
7 Numerical Examples
In this section we solve an example numerically to illustrate some of the results presented in
previous sections. We also explore some properties of optimal social contract that we have
not established formally.




; and h(m) = 
m1 
1   
in which m = 1 l bn is leisure, l is hours worked and n is number of kids for each parent.
For this example we asssume the following values for parameters:  = 0:3, R = 4,
 = 1:5,  = 0:5, b = 0:41 and  =  2. We assume two levels of productivity shocks
fL;Hg = f2;6g. Shocks are i.i.d across generations and dynasties and the probability of
the high shock is H = 0:1.
7.1 Endogenous fertility: private information vs. full information
Figure 1 shows the allocation in the economy in which fertility choice is endogenous. We have
presented the allocation rule for both the full information and private information economies.
The graphs highlight a few points.
1. If curren promised utility to the parent is high enough, it is ecient to have the low
ability type work zero hours. This holds both under full information and private
information. Furthermore, if current promised utility to the parent is even higher, it
is ecient to have both types work zero hours. At this level of promised utility (and
higher levels) the utility is delivered in a rst best fashion.
2. For all levels of current promised utility such that hours are positive, the fertility
allocation is monotone increasing in current promised utility (full information and
private information). For levels of current promised utility such that hours are zero,
fertility decreases with current promised utility.
3. For all levels of current promised utility such that hours are positive, promised utility
to children under full information is independent of current promised utility of the
parent (this is formally established in previous sections).
4. For all levels of current promised utility such that hours are positive, promised utility
to the high skilled parents' children under private information is independent of current
promised utility of the parent (this is formally established in previous sections).
5. For all levels of current promised utility such that hours are positive, promised utility
to the low skilled parents' children under private information information is monotone
decreasing in current promised utility of the parent.
6. For all levels of current promised utility that hours is zero, promised utility to the kids
is monotone increasing in current promised utility of the parent.
38It is important to note here that incentives are provided both by the level of promised
utility to the children and the number of children. In other words the future utility that is
promised to a parent is n(w;)w0(w;). This promised utility is always monotone increasing
in the current utility promised to the parent. Figure 2 illustrates this. Also note that, under
full information, the future utility promised to the high skilled parents is always lower than
the one promised to low skilled parents (for full info the blue line lies below the red line).
Also, it appears that under full information, future promised utility to the parents have
higher variance.
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Kids per parent, n(w, )
 
 
High shock   Privte Info.
Low shock   Privte Info.
High shock   Full Info.
Low shock   Full Info.
(c) (d)
Figure 1: Optimal consumption, hours, fertility and promised utility allocations. Allocations
in private information economy are plotted in thicker line. The blue indicates high shock
and red indicates low shock. The dashed line in panel (b) is the 45 degree line.
39We can use the procedure outlined in section 5 to compute the growth rate of population,
 and the stationary distribution of promised utility, 	. For full the information economy the
stationary distribution has support WFI = f 9:1607; 4:6591; 3:1255g and the frequency
distribution is given by  FI = f0:8998;0:058;0:0421g. The growth rate of population is
FI = 1:0624.
For the private information economy the stationary distribution has support
WPI = f 11:5428; 9:5892; 9:5837; 9:5836; 9:5833; 9:4970; 4:6938; 3:0826g and the
frequency distribution is  PI = f0:1495;0:0927;0:0660;0:3581;0:0782;0:1089;0:0858;0:0607g.
The growth rate of population is PI = 1:0355. Figure 3 shows the stationary distributions.
7.2 Endogenous fertility vs. exogenous fertility
In this section we compare the ecient allocation under private information in the benchmark
model (with fertility choice) to the allocation that comes out of a standard Mirrleesian
environment. The functional forms and parameters are the same as previous section. We
compare the case where  = 0 (exogenous fertility) to the case where  =  2.
Figure 4 shows the consumption, hours and promised utility (to the kids) allocations.
Figure 5 plots the future promised utility to the parents for both environments, i.e.
n(w;)w0(w;). Note that in the standard dynamic Mirrleesian environment,  = 0 and
future promised utility to the parent is the same as utility promised to the each kid.
































High shock   Privte Info.
Low shock   Privte Info.
High shock   Full Info.
Low shock   Full Info.
Figure 2: Future promised utility to the parents. Allocations in private information economy
are plotted in thicker line. The blue indicates high shock and red indicates low shock.
















Frequency of Stationary Distribution of Kid’s Promised Utility
















Stationary Distribution of Kid’s Promised Utility
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Stationary distribution. Panel (a) shows the frequency and panel (b) shows the
CDF. Stationary distribution in private information economy is plotted in blue. The red
graph is the stationary distribution under full information.


















Consumption Function, c(w, )
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High shock   Endogenous Fertility
Low shock   Endogenous Fertility
High shock   Exogenous Fertility
Low shock   Exogenous Fertility
(c)
Figure 4: Optimal consumption, hours, fertility and promised utility (to the kids) allocations.
Allocations in benchmark economy are plotted in thicker line. The blue indicates high shock
and red indicates low shock. The dashed line in panel (b) is the 45 degree line.































High shock   Endogenous Fertility
Low shock   Endogenous Fertility
High shock   Exogenous Fertility
Low shock   Exogenous Fertility
Figure 5: Future promised utility to the parents. Allocations in benchmark economy are
plotted in thicker line. The blue indicates high shock and red indicates low shock. . The
dashed line is the 45 degree line (it is relevant only for the  = 0 case, since otherwise the
future utility and current utility promised to the parent are not in the same space).
Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We rst prove part 4.




































































43For strict concavity of G, we must have GCC < 0, GCCGNN   G2































The rst inequality implies that u(c) is a concave function. As for the second inequality,
notice that when  is greater than 1, then since u00 < 0, the term in the brackets is negative
which contradicts the inequality. Therefore, we have - replacing c for C
N:
 < 1 ; u(c)u
00(c)   (   1)u
0(c)
2 < 0




  c2() = bR
taking derivative of the left hand side with respect to c2 gives the following:

u0(c)2   u0(c)u00(c)
u0(c)2   1 =
(   1)u0(c)2   u(c)u00(c)
u0(c)2 > 0
where the inequality is from above. Therefore c2() is increasing in  and independent of
W0.
Equations (3) and (4), imply that c1(), n(), and m()-leisure, are positively correlated.
Hence the binding feasibility implies that they are strictly increasing in W0 and l() =
1   m()   bn() is st. decreasing in W0.
Moreover, since by (2), c1() is independent of , equation (4) implies that n() is negatively
correlated with c2() and hence n() is st. decreasing in . Also by equation (3), leisure is
decreasing in  and therefore, labor supply is increasing in . 
44A.2 Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. We know from above that V (N;W) = Nv(N W). Strict concavity of V (N;W)















  ((1   )v
0(w)   wv
00(w))






























0(w)   v(w)) > 0
v
0(w) > 0
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof.
1. We have shown the results for w0(;) above. (18) immediately implies that c(w;)
is independent of . Now, by increasing , w0(w;) goes up as well as v0(w0(w;))
since v is concave. Because, c(w;) is independent of , (16) implies that n(w;) 1 is
increasing in , and since  < 1, we have that n(w;) is st decreasing in . (15) implies
that leisure is st. decreasing in  and since fertility is decreasing, hours worked will be
increasing in .
2. Convexity of v(w) and (18) implies that c(w;) is increasing in w. An increase in w,
causes a decrease in marginal utility of consumption and (16) implies that fertility is
increasing in w. Moreover, (15) means that leisure is increasing in w and therefore
hours worked is decreasing in w.
45A.4 Closed Form Solutions for Fertility
A.4.1 Two Period Example
Now if we assume that utility from consumption is CRRA, u(c) = c1 
1  , then (8) becomes
 +    1
1   
c2() = bR ) c2() =
1   
 +    1
bR














The above equation implies that fertility is a constant elasticity function of productivity, an
observation that is in accordance with the data15.
A.4.2 Fully Dynamic Version
To gain more intuition about how the model works, it is worth looking at the sequence
problem directly and characterize its solution. Here, we will focus on problem (P1')16. The












































 1) = N 1 : given
Notice that N does not appear in the constraint set since we are looking at total allocations
for each cohort with the same history. Assuming that the multiplier for feasibility constraint
15See Jones and Tertilt (2008)
16Solving (P1) instead of (P1') is more complicated since each fertility level appears in innitely many
terms.

















































































The above equations have the same interpretation as (15)-(18). Now assume that u(c) =
c1 
1  ;h(m) =   m1 
1 



















































 +    1
1   
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 +    1
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1 +  1=E1=
| {z }
B












17we will use m for leisure onward.
47A.5 Ecient Allocation is not Incentive Compatible
In this section, we show that the ecient allocation with full information does not satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraints for the maximization problem in section 4.
Intuitively, from intra-family risk sharing, equation (15), we know that per capita con-
sumption among siblings is equal. Moreover, eciency requires that leisure is decreasing in
productivity, equation (16). It is therefore sucient to show that future utility for a low
productivity agent is higher than a high productivity agent.
This is shown below.
One intuition for this comes from the curvature properties of the cost function, v(w). In
the unconstrained ecient allocation, the planner equates per capita marginal cost n()1 v0(w0())
across various types. We know from Corollary 2 that v0() has a curvature higher than
1 
 .
Therefore, for a given relative fertility  > 1, equating per capita marginal cost implies that
relative promised utility is at most  which implies that n()w0() has the same direction
as n() does. Hence, overall promised value, n()w0(), is higher for lower productivity
agents.
Formally, consider the ecient allocation, which is the solution to the dynamic program-











































































Moreover, from proposition 1, we know that c() does not depend on  and leisure is de-
48creasing in . Therefore 1   l()   bn() < 1   l(0)   bn(0) < 1   0l(0)=   bn(0), when
 > 0. These properties together with (32) gives us the following inequality














which means that under the ecient allocation, agents with higher productivity would like
to pretend to be low productivity. So the unconstrained ecient allocation is not incentive
compatible. 
A.6 Sucient Condition for Slackness of Upward Incentive Con-
straints
In this section, we give sucient conditions for slackness of upward incentive constraints.
That is we show that if the ecient allocation satises certain constraint, then downward
incentive constraints are sucient. We summarize the sucient conditions in the following
lemma:
Lemma 1 Suppose an allocation (c();l();n();w0()) satises the following:
1. l() is increasing in  ,
2. 1   l()   bn()  1  
0l(0)
   bn(0), for all  > 0
3. Local downward incentive constraints are binding:
u(c(i)) + h(1   l(i)   bn(i)) + n(i)w0(i) =
u(c(i 1)) + h(1  
i 1l(i 1)
i
  bn(i 1)) + n(i 1)w0(i 1)
Then, incentive compatibility holds for any ;0.
Proof. By part 3 of the assumption, we have
u(c(i 1)) + n(i 1)
w
0(i 1)   u(c(i))   n(i)
w
0(i) =




By part 2 and 3 of the assumption we have
1
i 1
(il(i)   i 1l(i 1)) 
1
i
(il(i)   i 1l(i 1))  b(n(i 1)   n(i))
49Hence, for any x 2 [1=i;1=i 1]
x(il(i)   i 1l(i 1))  b(n(i 1)   n(i))
) 1   xi 1l(i 1)   bn(i 1)  1   xil(i 1)   bn(i)
Therefore, using part 1 and concavity of h(),
 h
0(1   xi 1l(i 1)   bn(i 1))i 1l(i 1)   h
0(1   xil(i 1)   bn(i))il(i)

















  bn(i))   h(1   l(i 1)   bn(i 1))
Hence, the local upward incentive constraints are satised.
Now, we will show that other upward incentive constraints are satised . To illustrate
we show the argument for i and i + 2 and a similar inductive argument works for higher
dierences. By condition 2, we know that:
1
i+2




(i+2l(i+2)   i+1l(i+1)) 
1
i+1
(i+2l(i+2)   i+1l(i+1))  b(n(i+1)   n(i+2))
Hence, for any x 2 [1=i+1;1=i],
1   xi+1l(i+1)   bn(i+1)  1   xi+2l(i+2)   bn(i+2)
50and we have,
h
0(1   xi+1l(i+1)   bn(i+1))  h
0(1   xi+2l(i+2)   bn(i+2))
)  h
0(1   xi+1l(i+1)   bn(i+1))i+1l(i+1)   h













Rewriting local IC's for i;i + 1 and i + 1;i + 2:
u(c(i)) + n(i)
w






  bn(i+1))   h(1   l(i)   bn(i)) (34)
u(c(i 1)) + n(i+1)
w






  bn(i+2))   h(1   l(i+1)   bn(i+1)) (35)
Summing over inequalities (33)-(34), we get:
u(c(i 1)) + n(i)
w






  bn(i+2))   h(1   l(i)   bn(i))
which is the upward incentive constraint for i;i + 2. The rest of the upward and downward
incentive constraints can be proved in a similar way.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 6
We rst prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, then the value function and the policy func-












Proof. Consider the following set of function:
S =
(
^ v; ^ v 2 C(R ); ^ v: weakly increasing lim





Moreover dene the following mapping on S as





























u(ci) + h(1  
ili
j




i; 8j > i
cj;lj;nj  0
1  lj + bnj
We rst show that the solution to the above program has the claimed property for the
policy function and that T^ v satises the claimed property. Then, since S is closed and T
preserves S, by Contraction Mapping Theorem we have that the xed point of T belongs to
S.
Now, suppose the claim about policy function for fertility, does not hold. Then there
exists a sequence wn !  1 such that for some i, n(wn;i) !  ni > 0. For each j 6= i, dene
 nj = liminfn!1 n(wn;j), then we must have
liminf
n!1 T^ v(wn) 
X
j

















and therefore, if  nj  0, we must have







with equality only if  nj = 0. This implies that
liminf




since  ni > 0.
Now,we construct a sequence of allocation and show that the above cannot be an optimal










m(i) = ~ w < 0
If h is bounded above and below, dene









m(j)   u(cm(i))   nm(i)
w
0
m(i) =  ~ w

m(i   j); 8j > i
This expression converges to 1 and therefore, since h is bounded above and below for m
large enough, the allocations are incentive compatible.
53When, h is unbounded below, since the utility of deviation is bounded away from  1,
it is possible to construct a sequence for lm that converges to 1. Find lm(i) such that







u(cm(j)) + h(1   lm(j)   bnm(j)) + nm(j)w0
m(j)   u(cm(i))   nm(i)w0
m(i)
= ~ w




converges to 1. Moreover, by denition lm(i) converges to 1 and nm(i) converges to zero
and therefore the deviation value for leisure, h(1 
ilm(i)
j  bnm(i)) , converges to h(1 
i
j).
This implies that for m large enough
u(cm(j)) + h(1   lm(j)   bnm(j)) + nm(j)w0






and for m large enough the allocation is incentive compatible.
Therefore, The utility from the constructed allocation is the following:













j[h(1   lm(j)   bnm(j))]
It is clear that ^ wm's converge to  1 and the allocation's cost converges to  
P
j jj.
Now since ^ wmand wnconverge to  1, there exists subsequences ^ wmk and wnk such that




















and we have a contradiction. This completes the proof.
Since h is unbounded below, given the above lemma for w 2 R  low enough, allocations
should be interior and since v is dierentiable, positive lagrange multipliers ;(i;j)ji>j











































  bn(w;i)) = ii































Then for every  > 0, there exists W such that for all w < W, we have u0(c(w;j)) >
N
 ;h0(1   l(w;j)   bn(w;j)) > N































) (n   1;j;w) <
2
N




where an 1 = 1;an 2 = 2;an i = an 1 +  + an i+1 + 1. If we pick N so that a1 < N, we
have that
(i;j;w) < ; 8w < W






































Since hours converges to 1, the term multiplied by  in the above expression is bounded away




where wi satises 18
v
0(wi)wi   v(wi) = bRi

18Notice that by assumption 4,  wi 2 R, since bRi + v( 1) > 0. In addition, it can be shown that
v0(w)w ! 0 as w !  1.
56A.8 Proof of Corollary 3




This implies that there exists a w such that
8w  w; jw
0(w;i)   wij < 
By assumption 6, wi <  w. Now dene,
w = min






Notice that since w0 is a continuous function that is always in R and the inmum is taken over
a compact set, w is well-dened. Pick  > 0 small enough so that infw2[w;w];i w0(w;i) < wj 
for all j. Then by denition of w we must have
w
0(w;i) 2 [w;  w]; 8w 2 [w;  w]

Since utility is unbounded below and  is negative, n(w;i) must be positive. Hence we
can have the following corollary:
Corollary 6 For all w 2 [w;  w], we must have n(w;i)  n and
n(w;n)
n(w;i)  A, for all i 2
f1; ;ng and for some n;A > 0.
A.9 Assumption 6
Here we show that, under some additional assumptions, Assumption 6 can be shown to hold
from primitives.
Suppose there are I types  = f1;:::;Ig and i+1 > i for all 1 < i  I. We break the
proof into few lemmas.
Throughout this section, we make two additional assumptions:
1. V (N;W) is convex;
572. If l() = 0 for some , then l(0) = 0 for all 0 < ;
3. If all local downward incentive constraints are satised, all downward incentive con-
straints are satised.
















()(u(c()) + h(1   l()   bn()) + n()
w
0())  w













Lemma 3 For any w such that l(w;I) > 0 we have w0(w;i) < w0(w;I) for all i < I.
Proof. Let  and i be multipliers on promise keeping and incentive constraints. For now
suppose l(w;i) > 0 for all i. First order conditions are (we suppress the dependence of the



































































































for 1 < i < I.





























Since wv0(w) v(w) is increasing in w, to establish the claim of the lemma it is enough








































And this nishes the proof for the case in which l(w;i) > 0 for all i.
Now consider the case in which the non-negativity constraint on hours is binding for
some types. Let 1  j < I and suppose for all types i ,1  i  j we have l(w;i) = 0,
and for all types i, i > j we have l(w;i) => 0.Then all types i; 1  i  j receive the






















0(1   bn(i)) > i


























0(1   bn(I)   l(I))
Hence
1   bn(j) < 1   l(I)   bn(I)























Then l(I) has to be negative which is contradiction. Therefore, we must have w0(w;j) <
w0(w;I) for all w such that l(w;I) > 0. Since l(w;i) = 0 for all i < j, we also know that
w0(w;i) = w0(w;j) < w0(w;I) for all i < j.
Next we will nd the promised utility at which the non-negativity for the the type I
just binds. At this point, type L also works zeros hours and therefore both types receive
the same allocations.
Let ^ c and ^ n be the solution to the following equations
Iu
0(^ c) = h





60in which wH is the solution to the following equation
wIv
0(wI)   v(wI) = RbI
Dene
^ w = u(^ c) + h(1   b^ n) + ^ n
wI
Note that w0(^ w;I) = w0(^ w;i) = wI for all i.
Next we show that for w > ^ w, both types work zero hours and w0(w;) > wI for all .
Then we prove the claim of the proposition for two cases on wI > ^ w and wI < ^ w.
Lemma 4 If w > ^ w, then l(w;I) = 0.
Proof. Suppose otherwise and consider the following equations




































= R   1n
 2 @n
@w
The last two equations imply that @c
@w , @n
@w and @m
@w must have the same sign. The only way
that this can be consistent with the rst equation is that all have positive sign. If @m
@w > 0
and @n
@w > 0, then we must have @l
@w < 0. Evaluating this at w = ^ w implies that l(w;) < 0
for w > ^ w. This implies that for w > ^ w the non-negativity binds.
Next, we show that if wI > ^ w the claim in the proposition is satised.
61Lemma 5 If wI > ^ w, then there exist ^ w  w  0 such that w0(w;) = w.
Proof. Recall that that since l(w;)  0 is binding, both types work zero and receive the
same allocations. Therefore, the incentive constraint is slack. The rst order conditions for
type I are
h













0(1   bn(I)) > RbI
This implies, w0(w;H) > wH > ^ w. Dene the function w0











This function must have a xed point w
 2 [^ w; ]. We know that w0(;) = lim!0 w0
(;).
Then, either a ^ w < w < 0 exists such that w0(w;) = w or limw!0 w0(w;) = 0. (Note
that because no one works all types receive the same allocations).
So far we have established that if wI > ^ w, then we can choose w =  w = w and the
proposition is proved.
Now suppose wI  ^ w. Then, by Lemma 3, w(w;)  wI  ^ w for all w. Let  w = ^ w.
Then, using this along with Corollary 3, it follows that w0(w;) 2 [w;  w] for any w 2 [w;  w],
that is w0 maps the compact set [w;  w] into itself { i.e., Assumption 6 is satised.
62A.10 Proof of Remark 5
Since l(w;n) > 0 for all w 2 [w;w0], resetting property at the top holds. Therefore, by
denition































The constrained ecient allocation c





















u(cH) + h(1   lH   bnH) + n

Hu(c2) 
u(cL) + h(1  
LlL
H
  bnL) + n

Lu(c2):









































































Now suppose that we want to implement the above allocation with a tax in rst period
of the form T(y;n). Then consumer's problem is the following:
max u(c1) + h(1   l   bn) + n
u(c2)
s.t. c1 + k1  Rk0 + l   T(l;n)
nc2  Rk1
As a rst step, we assume that T is dierentiable and that y is interior for both types.




0(1   l   bn) = 1(1   Ty(l;n))
R1 = 2
 bh
0(1   l   bn) + n
 1u(c2) = 2c2 + 1Tn(l;n)





H) = 0 { there are no (marginal) distortions on the decisions of the agent with



































































































































Finally, we turn to Ty(Ll
L;n




































































Thus, from the FOC's of the agent's problem, we see that Ty(Ll
L;n
L) > 0.
A.11.2 Dening of Tax Function
Begin by dening the levels of utilities for the two types that are obtained at the socially
ecient allocation:
 uL = u(c










 uH = u(c










We dene two versions of the tax function. The rst, TL, is designed to make sure that
the low type always gets utility  uL if they satisfy their budget constraint with equality. The
second, TH, is dened similarly:
 uL = u(y   TL(y;n)  
1
R
nc2) + h(1  
y
L
  bn) + n
u(c2);
 uH = u(y   TH(y;n)  
1
R
nc2) + h(1  
y
H
  bn) + n
u(c2);
It can be shown that the locus of the points TH(y;n) = TL(y;n) is downward sloping in
(y;n) space.




L). We know that at the constrained ecient









66Hence we have the following equality:
 uH = u(c






















1L from budget constraints, we also get








































Moreover, from the denition of TH we know that





























H). This follows from the fact that type









 uL = u(c
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1L from budget constraints, we also get








































By denition of TLwe have

























67A.11.3 Proof of Proposition 7
Given the tax funtion, the consumer's problem is the following:
maxc1;y;n u(c1) + h(1  
y






nc2  y   T(y;n)











H;H) =  uH. Let (c1;y;n) be any allocation that satisfy c1 + 1





nc2 = y   maxfTL(y;n);TH(y;n)g  y   TH(y;n)
But by denition of TH, u(c1;y;n) can be at most  uH.







 uL. Moreover, any allocation that satisfy the budget constraint has utility at most  uL.
The diernitbaility of T and properties of marginal taxes follows form the discussion
above.
68B Linear Utility of Leisure
The problem becomes the following - h(m) =  m:19





















































































Notice that the set of reports is not restricted to lower reports since we can prove that general
incentive compatibility is equivalent to local downward constraints being binding and output
being increasing, a similar approach to Thomas and Worrall (1990). Notice that adding the












Therefore, if i > j, then iLi  jLj which mean output is increasing.
Moreover, if we assume that local downward IC constraints are binding and output is in-
creasing, it can be easily shown that the local upward constraints are satised and summing
over local incentive constraints gives the general ones. We also assume that output being
increasing is not binding so we can neglect it. Therefore the functional equation becomes
the following:























































































19Assume that  = f1 < 2 < ::: < ng. We will index allocations by i instead of .
69Let  N1  be the lagrange multiplier on promise-keeping constraint and  iN1  be the
multiplier for i-th IC constraint. Then the rst order condition for hours worked is the
following:
nn = (n + n) 
ii = (i + i  
ii+1
i+1
) ; i = 2; ;n (44)




We can dene 1 = n+1 = 0 and (44) holds for i = 1;:::;n. If we divide the i-th equation















































Since i's increasing, all the i's are positive.
The rst order conditions with respect to consumption are:






Obviously, we need consumption to be increasing as well as marginal utility to be positive.
This gives us a condition on distribution of i. Moreover, we can see that consumption is
independent of state variable (N;W).
The rst order conditions with respect to N0
i;W 0

















1 (i + i   i+1) (48)
Now for every i, dene after-tax-productivity as follows:
~ i =  
i + i   i+1
i
Notice that we have u0(Ci=N)~ i =   and ~ i does not depend on the state variables. From
before, we know that there exists a function v() such that V (N;W) = Nv(N W). There-
70fore,


















The above, implies that ni = N0
i=N;w0
i are also independent of the state. Moreover, from












Therefore, v() is a linear function and we must:














Notice that to satisfy assumption 2, we need Nh(M
N ) to be concave and therefore, to have
N 1M be weakly concave, we must have  = 1. In this case V (N;W) is linear in (N;W)
and therefore weakly convex.
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